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Abstract
We try to understand the basics of human image processing from a gist recognition per-7
spective. Because the gist is only a subset of the image’s information, we think that it is
extracted with help of interpretation (feedback). In a perceptual section we list possible mech-9
anisms that the interpretation process uses to determine the gist: in addition to the commonly
known local-to-global perception evolvement, there is likely to be also a global-to-local evolve-11
ment direction, a coarse=.ne scale, as well as a foreground=background scale. In a neural section
we .rst summarize feedback connections that can possibly be involved in gist recognition. Sec-13
ond, we propose that the perceptual mechanisms are spread all over the cortex and that cortical
visual computation occurs distributively rather than hierarchical. c© 2002 Published by Elsevier15
Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
We humans are able to understand the gist of a suddenly presented image in very19
short time, presumably before the .rst saccade (around 200 ms) is launched [15,20].
How can the visual system extract this subset of the image information in such short21
time? Scene perception is generally understood as an interaction of a bottom-up and
top-down component in information <ow. But does this scheme also hold for gist23
recognition? Recent models propose that only a pure bottom-up takes place during rapid
visual processing [22]. We list here evidence that gist recognition occurs distributively25
and quite possibly using feedback.
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Models of scene perception try to explain how the visual system performs a local-to-1
global perception along a hierarchy of neocortical, visual areas. In the .rst step, the
entire image is preprocessed in lower (early) cortical areas by dissecting it into its local3
features. Then, perception is built up by fusing the local features together to a global
percept in higher areas [14,6]. Attentional feedback from higher cortical areas would5
help fusing the corresponding features to form object perceptions in scenes [21]. We
see two major problems with this local-to-global feedback approach: (1) The cortical7
feedback connections, motivating the attentional feedback, are high in the hierarchy
and might be too slow for gist recognition. (2) Building up the percept from only9
local features, even with help of feedback, is a tricky task. We therefore search for
earlier feedback connections and for additional perceptual mechanisms (other than the11
local-to-global) supporting a fast gist recognition.
2. Perceptual mechanisms13
Because we can recognize the gist so rapidly, some psychologists have proposed that
we understand a scene by decomposing it in a global-to-local manner, meaning that we15
.rst perceive the global characteristics in an image and then later proceed to details
(‘forest before trees’, [11]). Navon’s study has triggered a debate about the local=global17
preference and presently it is discussed, whether local and global processing occurs
concurrently [8].19
An image can be processed on diHerent resolutional scales [3]. The original input
image represents the .ne scale, the low-pass .ltered (blurred) image represents a coarse21
scale. Oliva and Schyns [13] argue that depending on the task, a coarse-to-.ne or a
.ne-to-coarse scale processing can take place. Furthermore, they argue that on the23
coarse=.ne scale a local=global perception can take place and thus these scales are to
be treated as independent scales (Fig. 1a).25
A similar discussion takes place regarding foreground and background [9]. One can
understand the gist by .rstly perceiving a few key objects (foreground) of the scene,27
followed by concluding to the embedding context (background). Vice versa, the vi-
sual system could also .rstly process the background followed by the objects within29
(Fig. 1a).
In hardly any of the studies on these above debates could it be concluded that an31
image is parsed in only one direction of a scale. We therefore regard a picture of a
real-world scene as an individual, which needs to be processed individually. Thus, the33
interpretational power, using these diHerent evolvement scales, must be highly dynamic
and <exible.35
3. Neural mechanisms
There are two additional main types that can act earlier than the late cortico-cortical37
feedback (Fig. 1b): (1) Neocortical areas often project back to the lateral geniculate
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Fig. 1. (a) Perceptual evolvement directions involved in gist recognition. (b) Main recurrent connections in
the visual system found so far. For simplicity, only a few cortical visual areas are denoted (V1–V4, IT).
Three main types of feedback have been found in the visual brain: (1) From cortical areas to LGN. (2)
Feedback connections across layers in a cortical area (recycling arrow). (3) ‘Classic’ feedback connections
from higher cortical areas (IT) towards lower ones (V1), which have been used to explain scene recognition
models.
large as feedforward connections from LGN to V1 [17]. (2) There are substantial local1
recurrent connections across diHerent layers in V1 [5,2]. We posit that some of this
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In the local-to-global view, distinction between foreground=background and global=1
local information would occur in high cortical areas due to the gradual built-up of the
scene. Two lines of evidence suggest otherwise: (1) Earliest mammals had only V13
and V2 [1]. We assume that these areas did some sort of global processing (in order
to distinguish predator from prey or background) and that this global perception has5
been principally conserved throughout evolution. (2) Many hints indicate that cells in
V1 also encode global characteristics: Gestalt principles might be already implemented7
in V1 [18]; information for object size judgment might exist in all visual areas [4];
V1 orientation selective cells signal some sort of foreground=background distinction9
[19,10,23]. In conclusion, the summarized perceptual evolvement directions are not
layouted in a particular order along the hierarchy, but exist locally in many cortical11
areas.
The latter conclusion questions the pure usage of the hierarchy. We critizise it from13
two further aspects: (1) Anatomical studies have revealed many hierarchical discrep-
ancies: feedforward and feedback connections do not only project to the next higher15
or lower level in the hierarchy, respectively, but also jump one or more levels [7].
(2) Spike timing recordings have shown that higher areas can be activated earlier than17
lower ones [12,16]. Some visual information could be .rst processed in higher areas
and then fed back to lower ones. We therefore think that visual input is almost con-19
currently spread across several areas and then processed by communicating with each
other rapidly in a distributive manner.21
4. Summary
(1) Gist recognition can occur on three diHerent recognition evolvement scales (Fig.23
1a) driven by the interpretational process.
(2) These evolvement scales are distributed all over neocortex.25
(3) Scenes are thus processed very distributively using likely the many feedback loops
in the visual system—even before the .rst saccade.27
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